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Editor’s Introduction
William T. Gavin
and Michael Woodford extend the New Keynesian
model to feature three aspects of monetary policy
that have been important during the 2007 finan-
cial crisis and its aftermath. The three aspects are
interest rate policy, reserve policy (quantitative
easing), and credit policy (central bank lending
to the nonfinancial sector). They introduce two
types of households with different degrees of
patience, thus creating a reason for a private bond
market. Intermediation is done through banks,
which also hold interest-bearing bank reserves.
The optimal reserve policy is achieved by
satiating the banking system with reserves. For
the Federal Reserve, this is achieved by setting
the target interest rate to the rate paid on bank
reserve deposits. There are no beneficial effects
of further “quantitative easing” once this level is
achieved unless it is associated with increased
central bank lending to the private sector—that is,
the credit policy.
The optimal interest rate policy is approxi-
mately the same as in the standard New Keynesian
framework as long as the interest rate target
remains above the zero lower bound. The optimal
policy is to keep the inflation rate on target. The
effect of financial frictions on the desired paths
for the price level and output are small as long as
the interest rate remains above zero. The analysis
of policy at the zero lower bound relies heavily
T
he Thirty-Fourth Annual Policy
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis was held October 15-16,
2009. This conference focused on theory
and measurement in economies with financial
frictions and the analysis of unconventional poli-
cies designed to end financial crises. This issue
includes four articles that were presented at the
conference.
The article by Cúrdia and Woodford directly
addresses current policy issues being debated at
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings.
It provides analysis of the “extended period”
language in the FOMC policy statements, how
to define an exit strategy and determine its tim-
ing, whether one should pay interest on excess
reserves, and, given the size of the Federal Reserve
balance sheet, whether or not asset sales should
be made in a state-contingent fashion. Fernández-
Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez
also use the New Keynesian framework. They
estimate the size of the effects that monetary pol-
icy had on the “Great Inflation” and the “Great
Moderation.” The other two articles focus on
developments in monetary theory. Williamson and
Wright argue that it is time for a New Monetarist
framework to compete with the New Keynesians.
Lagos provides an example of a model that might
explain important aspects of the liquidity crisis
that has dominated monetary policy discussion
since September 2007.1
In the first article, “Conventional and
Unconventional Monetary Policy,” Vasco Cúrdia
1 The conference included eight presentations: The agenda, with links
to the other presentations, can be found at http://research.stlouisfed.
org/conferences/policyconf/34program.html.
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At the zero lower bound, the policy recommenda-
tion becomes more interesting and sheds some
light on positions in the current policy debate
concerning the “extended period” language and
the question about whether central bank portfolio
policy should be sensitive to changes in the state
of the economy.
Cúrdia and Woodford explain the reason for
the extended period language: The point is that
the central bank must abandon the interest rate
for targeting inflation at the zero lower bound.
At this point, there is a path for the price level
implied by the inflation target. The achievement
of the target would lead to a path for the price
level that defines a benchmark to anchor inflation
expectations through the episode of zero nominal
rates. Eventually, the shock that caused the econ-
omy to falter and the interest rate to go to zero
will dissipate and the inflation rate will return
to target. However, during the interim, the price
level will have fallen below the path that was
expected before the bad shock occurred. Using
this price path to guide policy will cause the inter-
est rate to be below the rate needed to stabilize
inflation for an extended period. During this
period, inflation will rise above the target. The
extended period should last until the price level
returns to the path that had been anticipated before
the bad shock occurred.
The presence of financial frictions actually
affects the output gap and the interest rate response
relative to the standard model; but, again, the
effects are small. This article justifies the use of
the extended period language, but also implies
that the policy needs to be clear about the price
level path that would have been desired in the
absence of the shock that led policy to the zero
lower bound. In this model, inflation can continue
to fall and the output gap can remain large for a
long time if the policymakers do not specify the
price path. The reason is simply that the public
believes that the policy is to achieve an inflation
target in a way that will let bygones be bygones.
It is difficult to say much about the optimal
credit policy in this framework because the credit
frictions are exogenous with respect to policy. It
is assumed that the optimal credit policy comes
from microeconomic considerations that are not
discussed. In this model, central bank intervention
in credit markets does not affect risky lending or
borrowing behavior and there is no accounting
for the moral hazard caused by too-big-to-fail
policies. But the optimal interest rate policy is
independent of the optimal credit policy. 
It is the credit policy that leads to large-scale
excess reserves. These excess reserves will have
no effect, and there is no reason to make the asset
sales or purchases contingent on the factors that
enter the interest rate rule. As long as the interest
rate is at the zero bound, the asset sales should
depend on two things: (i) the state of credit mar-
kets—the source of the need for the current credit
policy—and (ii) whether the price level has
returned to the desired path—which would mark
the end of the “extended period” of excessively
low interest rates.
In the second article, “New Monetarist
Economics: Methods,” Stephen Williamson and
Randall Wright argue that we need a camp to pro-
vide loyal opposition to the New Keynesian view.
They begin with a summary of the Keynesian and
Monetarist views and go on to present a brief
critique of the New Keynesian framework. Of
course, like the New Keynesians, they take for
granted that general equilibrium methods with
optimizing agents are important and necessary
to give good policy advice. Williamson and Wright
argue that recent advances in monetary theory
suggest that the sticky price frictions are no longer
the only, or necessarily the best, way to introduce
real effects of monetary policy into our models.
Williamson and Wright work through a
benchmark search money model, reviewing the
history of developments in this literature and giv-
ing an example of the methods typically used by
researchers. The authors report some key results
that are familiar from an older macroeconomic
literature and show how being more explicit about
the microfoundations can, in some instances, lead
to very different results. They discuss the sensi-
tivity of the benchmark model to alternative
matching and bargaining assumptions, to ex ante
heterogeneity, and to other extensions. They use
the framework to answer questions involving asset
pricing, liquidity, and financial intermediation.
Gavin
226 JULY/AUGUST 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWAlthough the authors do not say it this way,
the fundamental difference between the New
Keynesian literature and the New Monetarist lit-
erature they describe is that the New Keynesians
write for the policymaker who needs answers
today and the New Monetarists include almost
everyone doing basic research on monetary theory.
Therefore, the New Keynesians start with a basic
general equilibrium business cycle model and
impose frictions that make monetary policy matter,
and they directly answer questions about how to
operate monetary policy from day to day and
quarter to quarter. For the policymaker, an impor-
tant aspect of the New Keynesian model is that it
recommends price stability, in perfect confluence
with three centuries of central banking wisdom.
New Keynesians continue to develop more com-
plex models that can be used to answer a broader
array of questions. These models have changed
and developed, not by questioning the fundamen-
tal assumptions about frictions and the monetary
transmission mechanism, but by adding more and
more detail about the economy. So, for example,
Edge, Kiley, and Laforte (2007) have developed a
fairly large New Keynesian model that includes
two sectors—consumption goods and capital
goods. Some of the frictions include sticky prices,
sticky wages, habit formation, and capital adjust-
ment costs for each type of capital (including hous-
ing, durable consumption goods, and business
investment). There are many sources of shocks
to preferences and technology. The point of the
New Keynesian agenda is not to test the basic
assumptions about frictions and shocks, but to
use them to evaluate past and proposed policies.
As noted by Cúrdia and Woodford in the first
article, the recent financial crisis has revealed
weaknesses in the standard New Keynesian frame-
work—not necessarily the assumption of sticky
prices but, rather, the lack of a market for risky
debt and the mechanisms relating it to interest
rate policy.
To compete with the New Keynesian frame-
work as the benchmark for policymakers, the New
Monetarists must develop quantitative theoretic
versions of their models that can be used to answer
policy questions. The New Monetarists, however,
have never shown much interest in giving policy
advice. They have revealed an interest in develop-
ing better theories to deal with questions involv-
ing money and financial markets. Their success
as a research program is most obvious in the way
it connects with frontier research in other areas of
economics, including search theory, game theory,
labor theory, the microstructure of financial mar-
kets, models of the payments system, models of
private  information and incomplete communica-
tion, and quite recently models of bilateral trad-
ing in over-the-counter markets. What the New
Monetarists have not developed is a following of
empirically oriented economists who would take
these models to the data to compete with the New
Keynesian policy advisors.
In the third article, “Asset Prices, Liquidity,
and Monetary Policy in the Search Theory of
Money,” Ricardo Lagos develops a model in which
money coexists with equity shares that can be
used as money. The model includes uncertainty
about aggregate liquidity needs. In this model,
agents’ purchases are constrained by the amount
of assets (money and equity) they hold. Shocks to
the asset price act as shocks to aggregate liquidity.
This stripped-down macroeconomic model
can be used to understand theoretical aspects of
the current liquidity crisis. Gorton and Metrick
(2009) blame the financial crisis on bank runs—
although not runs on traditional banks, but on
shadow banks that suddenly found that the price
of mortgage derivatives had fallen and depositors
would no longer accept subprime mortgage paper
as collateral. Even the highest rated mortgage paper
received a large haircut after September 2008.
Although the Lagos model does not include mech-
anisms to explain why there should have been
such a large shock, it does derive the optimal mone-
tary policy in an environment where other assets
provide monetary services and it includes a mech-
anism to explain how targeting the nominal inter-
est rate off the optimal path can affect real asset
prices.
The fourth article, “Reading the Recent
Monetary History of the United States, 1959-2007,”
by Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Pablo Guerrón-
Quintana, and Juan F. Rubio-Ramírez is an excel-
lent example of how to use the New Keynesian
model to analyze monetary policy actions taken
in the past. It illustrates both the strengths and
weaknesses of the New Keynesian framework. If
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identify the model—assumptions about the
assumed frictions and the priors used to identify
parameters—this model can be used to estimate
the effects of policy on the cyclical behavior of
output and its components. It can also be used to
estimate the effect of policy on the cyclical behav-
ior of inflation—where the cycle is not the same
as the business cycle. The article addresses two
questions: (i) What explains the gradual run-up
of inflation that peaked in 1980 and its subsequent
rapid decline? and (ii) What explains the modera-
tion in the volatility of the real economy after 1984?
They use sophisticated econometric procedures to
estimate a model with time-varying policy param-
eters and shocks with time-varying volatility.
The strength of the New Keynesian frame-
work is that one can give quantitative answers to
many interesting questions if policy actions are
taken and the assumed frictions are reasonable.
If the identifying assumptions of the model are
not useful, then the fluctuations in the output and
inflation will be attributed to stochastic shocks.
Section 6 of the article is a sophisticated sort of
regression accounting in which the authors use
their model to analyze the Federal Reserve under
the regimes of various Fed Chairmen: Martin,
Burns, Volcker, and Greenspan. They spice their
econometric accounting with interesting stories
from the historical record.
In contrast to the analysis by John Taylor
(1998) and Ben Bernanke (2004), these authors
find that the moderation in output volatility fol-
lowing the end of the Great Inflation had little
to do with better monetary policy, but instead
was caused by a reduction in the volatility of the
shocks. This premise suggests that a richer model
of the economy is needed to understand what is
being left as a residual shock. The authors also
conclude that this change in the volatility of
shocks was an important reason for the secular
rise of inflation. It is interesting that in Section 7,
where they discuss what assumptions might be
investigated, they include assumptions that (i)
the public knows the policy parameters, (ii) policy
changes are exogenous with respect to the state
of the economy, (iii) the drifts in technologies are
constant, and (iv) important sectors have been
omitted (fiscal and international). They never
suggest that the assumption of time-dependent
price frictions might be flawed. Also, they do not
mention a need for including financial interme-
diation and risky debt markets. Evidently, these
elements were not needed to explain history
before 2007.
Here, in 2010, these four articles are important
additions to the economic literature and the policy
discussion. We thank the authors for their con-
tributions and hope our readers find them useful
and engaging.
Gavin
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